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NATIONAL RECONCILIATION UNDER THE
NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE
NEW MILLENNIUM
Johan D. van der Vyver*
On June 15 through July 17, 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries was held in Rome, Italy, with a view to
"finalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an
international criminal court."' The Rome Conference was preceded by
deliberations in New York of an Ad Hoc Committee (1995) and a Preparatory
Committee (1996-1998), operating under a mandate of the General Assembly
of the United Nations to refine a Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court that had been prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC).
The Rome Conference culminated in the approval, by majority vote, of the
text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.2 The Statute will enter
into force following its ratification by 60 states. At the closing date
(December 31, 2000), 139 countries have signed the ICC Statute, and as of
date 27 states have deposited their instruments of ratification with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Chapter Two of the ICC Statute dealing with "Jurisdiction, Admissibility
and Applicable Law" became the focus in New York and in Rome of the
most profound controversies that attended the establishment of an
International Criminal Court (ICC). This applied in different degrees to all
four components of the concept of jurisdiction: subject-matter jurisdiction,
jurisdiction in terms of time, jurisdiction in regard to the person, and
jurisdiction pertaining to the locality of a crime.
In terms of a preambular paragraph in the ILC's Draft Statute, the
jurisdiction of the ICC was to be complementary to that of national courts. In
thrashing out the exact meaning and implications of this directive,
participants in the Ad Hoc Committee and PrepCom added a new word to
the English language: "complementarity." 3 The word "complementarity"
has been common usage in Roman Catholic doctrine to denote a certain
* I.T. Cohen Professor of Law and Human Rights at Emory Law School and a Fellow in the
Human Rights Program of the Carter Center.
1 G.A. Res. 52/160 of 15 Dec. 1997 (annex), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/52/49,
at 384, par. 3.
2 Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998)
(hereafter "ICC Statute").
5 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language defines "complementarity" as
"the state or fact of being complementary; necessary interrelationship or correspondence."
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symbiosis in the relationship between the sexes.4 Within the meaning of ICC
usage, "complementarity" denotes a secondary role - not in importance but
in the sequence of events: national courts have the first right and obligation
to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes that come within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC (genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, as defined in the Statute), and ICC jurisdiction, being
complementary to that of national courts, can only be invoked if the national
court is unwilling or unable to prosecute.5
Under the rubric of complementarity, the ICC must thus establish
whether the national court is "unwilling" or "unable" to bring the
perpetrator of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC to justice. While
inability to prosecute can be established on a factual (objective) basis,
"unwillingness" requires the ICC to pass judgment on the merits of the
criminal justice system of a national state. This evidently implicates the
sovereignty of states.
This article focuses on the concept of "unwillingness", and, in particular,
on the question of whether truth commissions and amnesty-attending
political transitions could be seen as constituting "unwillingness" within the
meaning of the ICC Statute.
I. UNWILLINGNESS TO PROSECUTE
Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute describes "unwillingness" as a
precondition for setting ICC jurisdiction in motion:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case,
the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of
4The Cathechism of the Roman Catholic Church, par 372 proclaims that man and woman are
"equal as persons ... and complementary as masculine and feminine." Based on this premiss, it
further states (in par. 2333): "Everyone, man and woman, should acknowledge and accept the
sexual identity. Physical, moral, and spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented
toward the goods of marriage and the flourishing of family life. The harmony of the couple and
of society depends in part on the way in which the complementarity, needs, and mutual support
between the sexes are lived out." The Roman Catholic Church consequently condemns
homosexuality because it does not "proceed from a genuine affective and sexual
complementarity" (par. 2357).
5 It might be noted that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Tribunal for Rwanda proceeded on the contrary assumption, namely, that their
jurisdiction enjoys precedence over that of national courts. Statute of the Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993), art. 9(2); Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994),
art. 8(2); and see also Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) (Trial Chamber), 105 I.L.R. 420, par. 41-4 (at
440-01); Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) (Appeals Chamber), 105 I.L.R. 453, par. 50-64 (at 476-85).
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due process recognised by international law, whether one or
more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court...;
A. There has been an unjustified delay in the
proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
B. The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they were
or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice.
Unwillingness also has a bearing on the principle of ne bis in idem as
defined in the ICC Statute. The rule against double jeopardy reiterates that
the trial of a particular person in a national court will not preclude the ICC
from prosecuting the person for conduct that constituted the basis of that
trial6 if (i) the purpose of the proceedings in the national court was to shield
the person concerned from prosecution in the ICC for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court, or (ii) those proceedings were not conducted
"independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process
recognised by international law" and it is furthermore demonstrated that the
proceedings were "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice."7
A. Impunity-for-Peace Agreements
International law as a general rule condemns the granting of amnesty by
national governments for conduct that constitutes crimes under customary
international law. Blanket amnesty for criminal conduct prohibited by
customary international law as a matter of ius cogens, and consequently
6 It might be noted that the international norm depicting the rule against double jeopardy
differs from the American perception of that rule: in the United States double jeopardy only
excludes a second trial for the same crime (a person convicted or acquitted in a state court can
again be tried for the same act in a federal court, or vice versa), whereas the international
standard of ne bis in idem excludes a second trial for the same conduct.
7 ICC Statute, art. 20(3).
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subject to universal jurisdiction, is a contradiction in terms and cannot
possible be lawful under the rules of contemporary international law.8 Jo
Pasqualucci argues that self-amnesties "have no juridical validity."9 Stephen
Landsman maintains that certain violations of human rights, notably
genocide, should never be excused. 10
There is indeed a body of opinion holding that contemporary
international law compels the successor government to punish members of a
previous regime for atrocities that constitute crimes under customary
international law." Juliana Kokott thus argues that "the concept of state
responsibility [to punish serious violations of human rights] applies to states
not to governments" and that "[e]ven a drastic change in government does
not exonerate a state from its international responsibility." 12 The duty under
international law to punish serious violations of human rights, according to
her, implies "a prohibition of amnesties even in the case of transition from a
military dictatorship to a democratic regime.""3 Cherif Bassiouni likewise
proclaimed:
Peoples of the world ... reject the practice of
governments to barter away justice in exchange for political
settlements; instead, they expect accountability, whose
mechanisms include international criminal prosecution. 14
8 See John Dugard, Reconciliation and justice: The South African Experience, in 8 TRANSNAT'L &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 307-08 (1998); Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, in 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 127,
134 (1996); Heinz Klug, Amnesty, Amnesia and Remembrance: International Obligations and the Need
to Prevent the Repetition of Gross Violations of Human Rights, in 92 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 316,317
(1998).
9 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity
and the Inter-American Human Rights System, in 12 B.U. INT'L LJ. 321, 343 (1994).
10 Stephen Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution
and Truth Commissions, in 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 90-91 (1996).
It See, for example, Diana F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, in 100 YALE L.J. 2535, 2595-612 (1991); Peter A. Schey, Dinah
Shelton & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Addressing Human Rights Abuses: Truth Commissions and the Value
of Amnesty, in 19 WHrrIER L. REV. 325, 331 (1997). Douglas Cassel argues that amnesty should
not apply to serious violations of human rights. Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for
International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, in 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 229 (1996).
12 Juliana Kokott, No Impunity for Human Rights Violations in the Americas, in 14 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 153,158 (1993)
13 Id., at 159.
14 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMEs AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 513
(1999).
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As it stands, this statement is too simplistic. Restorative justice-
reparation, rehabilitation, and reconciliation ought to be the primary concern
of authorities charged with the reconstruction of society after a period of
mass atrocities, and circumstances might prevail in which this form of justice
cannot be achieved while, or if, criminal retribution is the primary goal.
Political objectives to be pursued by communities in transition-the creation
of new governmental structures and fostering a climate conducive to human
rights protection 5 -have little chance of success while the pursuit of
restorative justice remains in abeyance.
John Dugard has argued that "state practice at this time is too unsettled
to support a rule of customary international law obliging a successor regime
to prosecute those alleged to have committed crimes against humanity in all
circumstances," 16 and that it is unlikely that international law will develop
"sufficiently" to support such a rule.17 Michael Scharf also noted a few years
ago that "the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of
an obligation under customary international law to refrain from conferring
amnesty for... crimes [against humanity]." 5 He goes on to point out: "That
the United Nations, itself, has felt free of legal constraints in endorsing recent
amnesty for peace deals underscores this conclusion." 19 One could even go
further and assert that international law is actually supportive of amnesties
that constitute "a necessary and ... justified bargaining chip to induce
human rights violators to agree to peace and to relinquish power." 20
Truth commissions attended by impunity-for-peace arrangements have
seemingly become a strategy for national reconciliation 2' that will not simply
go away.22 Nor ought they to be discouraged. Protocol II Additional to the
15 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGWENESS 22-23 (1998).
16 Dugard, supra note 8, at 306.
17 Id., at 308.
Is Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 59 (1996).
19 Id., at 61; and see also Dugard, supra note 8, at 284-85.
2D Michael P. Scharf, Justice versus Peace, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 179,180 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen, eds., 2000).
21 Karen Cavanaugh depicted the function of truth commissions as "exposing the truth
about the past to help heal the future." Karen Cavanaugh, Emerging South Africa: Human Rights
Responses in the Post-Apartheid Era, in 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 322 (1997). Lansing
and King, again, spoke of the "sacrifice of individual justice in order to achieve national unity
and healing." Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, in 15 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 753, 787 (1998).
22 Priscilla Hayner has identified fifteen truth commissions that were established in the
period of twenty years (1974-1994), including one established in 1993 by the United Nations for
El Salvador. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16
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Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 indeed encourages "the broadest
possible amnesty" at the end of hostilities in cases of armed conflict not of an
international character.23 The significance of this provision speaks for itself,
but it must not be overstated: it applies only if political change has been
preceded by (i) armed conflict (ii) not of an international character; and it
must not be taken to authorize blanket amnesty. In terms of Protocol II, the
granting of amnesty under this provision only applies to "the prosecution
and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict"; 24 and a
preambular directive emphasizes "the need to ensure a better protection for
the victims of those armed conflicts." In their analysis of legal challenges to
the granting of amnesty in different countries, Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren
Gibson therefore argues that blanket amnesty which also deprives victims of
access to the courts for redress would be unacceptable. 25
Within the United Nations system, amnesty as a condition of peace in
situations of political transition has received a sympathetic ear. In a
preliminary report of Special Rapporteur Joinet of the Commission on
Human Rights' Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities on The Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of
Human Rights Violations, the following paragraph appears:
From the origins of mankind until the present day, the
history of impunity is one of perpetual conflict and strange
paradox: conflict between the oppressed and the oppressor,
civil society and the State, the human conscience and
barbarism; the paradox of the oppressed who, released from
their shackles, in turn take over the responsibility of the state
and find themselves caught in the mechanism of national
HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 601-03 (1994). Since then, there has also been the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, established in 1995, and the Guatemala Clarification Commission,
established in 1996. See Dugard, supra note 8, at 287-88. See also in general, Naomi Roht-Arriaza
& Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurispndence on Amnesty, in 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 843,846-61 (1998).
The United States proposed a truth commission for Cambodia-not to afford amnesty but to
uncover the truth of atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge regime. See Theresa Mosterman,
The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia, in 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833
(1998).
23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol Il), 1977, art. 6(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 16
lL.M. 1442 (1977).
24 Id., art. 6(1).
2 Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 22, at 844.
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reconciliation, which moderates their initial commitment
against impunity.26
In an Afterword to the Sub-Commission's final report published in 1997,
the Special Rapporteur responded as follows to concerns that
implementation of the principles enunciated in the Report might stifle efforts
at national reconciliation:
To those who might be tempted to regard the set of
principles proposed here as an obstacle to national
reconciliation, I would answer this: these principles are not
legal standards in the strict sense, but guiding principles
intended not to thwart reconciliation but to avoid distortions
in policies so that, once beyond the first stage, which is more
'conciliation' than reconciliation, the foundations of a 'just
and lasting reconciliation' may be laid.27
The Security Council of the United Nations has also endorsed amnesties
that attended national reconciliation in strife-torn communities. One of the
more recent impunity-for-peace pacts that illustrates the point is the one
concluded on Governors Island, New York to bring an end to the military
rule in Haiti of General Raoul Cddras and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby
following their assumption of power in a coup in 1990.28 The Governors
Island Agreement of July 3, 1993 between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
and General Cd dras contained an express amnesty decree,29 and compliance
with its provisions was insisted upon by the Security Council.30
26 Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Preliminary Report on The Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6 (1993).
2 Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), par. 49, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (1997).
28 See Scharf, supra note 20, at 180-81.
29 Governers Island Agreement, par. 6, U.N. Doc 2/26063, reprinted in 48 DCOR (Supp for July,
August and September 1993) at 41 (1993).
30 See Statement of the President of the Security Council (23 October 1993), U.N. Doc. S/26633,
reprinted in 48 SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 126 (1993).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-2000-2003
The sanctioning of amnesties as a condition of peace is not
unconditional. On the regional level, certain opinions of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights are instructive in this regard.3'
The Commission came out in full support of a truth commission
established in Chile by democratically-elected President Aylwin, after the
reign of terror of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), with a view to
establishing "the most complete picture possible of the most serious human
rights violations committed between September 11, 1973 and March 11, 1990,
whether in Chile or abroad, when the acts committed abroad have to do with
the Chilean State or with Chilean political life." 32 The Commission did not
express an opinion on the granting of general amnesty by the military regime
or the bill on a pardon before the Chamber of Deputies at the time. It noted,
though, that the truth commission would not assume judicial functions that
are within the purview of a court of law or interfere in cases pending before
the courts; and although the proceedings of the truth commission were to be
conducted in private, the truth commission was mandated to submit to the
President a public report.
A case involving Uruguay 33 invited less favorable comments. Here
general amnesty was granted for crimes committed by military and police
personnel with political motives, in the performance of their functions, or on
orders from commanding officers. Military judges were to decide amnesty
applications, and there was indeed no truth commission. In its Annual Report
of 1985-1986, the Commission emphasized the right of access to the truth of
family members of victims of human rights violations, and freedom of
speech which is presupposed by that right. It noted that victims and their
next-of-kin are now denied their "right to legal redress, to an impartial and
exhaustive judicial investigation that clarifies the facts, ascertains those
responsible and imposes the corresponding criminal punishment." 34 This
violates the obligation of States Parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights, by virtue of their commitment "to ensure ... the free and full exercise
31 See Kokott, supra note 12; Pasqualucci, supra note 9, at 336-43; Robert O. Weiner, Trying to
Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, in 26 ST. MARY'S L.J.
857,866-67 (1995).
32 "Chile", INTER-AM. C.H.R. 133, OEA/Ser.L/V./77 rev. 1, doc. 7 (1990), reprinted in
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 570 (1995).
3 Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, and 10.375 (Uruguay), INTER-
AM. C.H.R. 154, OEA/Ser.L/V./II.83, doc. 14 (1993), reprinted in BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON,
supra note 32, at 565.
uReferred to in id., at par. 37.
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of those rights and freedoms" recognized in the Convention 35 to "prevent,
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized in the
Convention."36
In yet another matter, one involving El Salvador,3 ' general and absolute
amnesty for "political crimes or common crimes linked to political crimes or
common crimes in which the number of persons involved is no less than
twenty" was granted following the publication of a truth and reconciliation
report. The amnesty also precluded civil trials in which victims could seek
redress. The Commission emphasized the principle that the rights of victims
should be protected, and the need for human rights violations committed
prior to the establishment of a democratic government to be investigated.
Amnesty was therefore granted in disregard of the legitimate right of the
victim's next-of-kin to reparation.38
Juliana Kokott concluded from jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights "an affirmative duty to investigate grave
human rights violations, to identify those responsible, to impose the
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victims adequate compensation,"
adding that this even includes a duty to punish private persons or groups of
persons.39 She was, however, not prepared to rule out amnesties under all
circumstances, and presumably regarded the right of victims and of society
"to find out the truth about human rights violations committed under
previous dictatorial regimes" to be a valid consideration in this regard. 40
B. Legitimacy of Truth Commissions and Amnesties
Several analysts have proposed international standards to be satisfied by
truth commissions and in the granting of amnesty. Truth commissions and
amnesty must in general serve the demands of restorative justice.
3 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1(1), O.A.S. OFFICIAL RECORDS, OEA.
Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev.1, corr. I (1970); reprinted in 9 I.LM. 99 (1970); 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679
(1971).
36 Id., at par. 50.
37 "Enactment of the Amnesty Law and El Salvador's International Commitments," INTER-
AM. C.H.R. 69, OEA/Ser.L/V./II.85, doc. 28, rev. 1 (1994), reprinted in BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON,
supra note 32, at 560; and see also Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations' Truth Commission for
El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 27 (1994).
38 See also Cases No. 10.147, 10.181, 10.240. 10.262, 10.309 and 10.311, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 1,
OEU/ser. L/V./11.82, doc. 5 (1993) (the Argentina Report) (concerning amnesty for soldiers
claiming to have acted pursuant to superior orders).
39 Kokott, supra note 12, at 159.
4 Id.
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Martha Minow vividly outlined some of the strategies of restorative
justice:41
Potential responses to collective violence include not
only prosecutions and amnesties, but also commissions of
inquiry into the facts; opening access to secret police files;
removing prior political and military officials and civil
servants from their posts and from the rolls for public
benefits; publicizing names of offenders and names of
victims; securing reparations and apologies for victims;
devising and making available appropriate therapeutic
services for any affected by the horrors; devising art and
memorials to mark what happened, to honor victims, and to
communicate the aspiration of "never again"; and advancing
public education programs to convey what happened and to
strengthen participatory democracy and human rights.
Elsewhere, she enumerated twelve goals, alongside truth-seeking and
justice, that ought to determine societal responses to collective violence:42
1. overcome communal and official denial of the atrocity
and gain public acknowledgment;
2. obtain the facts in an account as full as possible in
order to meet victims' need to know, to build a record for
history, and to ensure minimal accountability and visibility
of perpetrators;
3. end and prevent violence; transform human activity
from violence-and violent responses to violence-into
words and instrumental practices of equal respect and
dignity;
4. forge the basis for a domestic democratic order that
respects and enforces human rights;
5. support the legitimacy and stability of the new regime
proceeding after the atrocity;
41 MINOW, supra note 15, at 23.
42 Id., at 87-88.
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6. promote reconciliation across social divisions;
reconstruct the moral and social systems devastated by
violence;
7. promote psychological healing for individuals,
groups, victims, bystanders, and offenders;
8. restore dignity to victims;
9. punish, exclude, shame, and diminish offenders for
their offences;
10. express and seek to achieve the aspiration that
"never again" shall such collective violence occur;
11. build an international order to try to prevent and
also to respond to aggression, torture, and atrocities;
12. accomplish each of these goals in ways that are
compatible with the other goals.
According to Jo Pasqualucci, who has also considered the question of
amnesty for gross violations of human rights, amnesty would be acceptable
if it is endorsed by an international organization, such as the United Nations
or the Organization of American States, as a condition for returning to a state
of democratic governance, or as a condition for peace provided the amnesty
applies to perpetrators of international crimes on all sides of the conflict.
Pasqualucci was also satisfied with amnesties granted to the security forces
of a prior (repressive) regime by a democratically-elected successor
government. However, he also endorsed the principle that amnesty laws
must not contravene a state's international obligations under any human
rights treaty,and must not render reparation to victims of the atrocities
obsolete.43 Victims' interests may be served by an investigation into the
human rights abuses, public dissemination of the facts, rehabilitation of the
victims' reputation, and financial compensation.44
Within the United Nations System, a Report on the Human Rights of
Detainees, submitted in 1996 to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, also emphasized the right of
Pasqualucci, supra note 9, at 349, 354-356.
4Id., at 355.
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victims of human rights violations to know, to justice, and to reparation.45
The Report thus proclaims that "[a]mnesty cannot be accorded to
perpetrators before the victims have obtained justice by means of an effective
remedy;"46 In a more elaborate exposition of the principle pertaining to
"Restrictions on the Practice of Amnesty", the Report thus proclaims that (i)
amnesty should not be granted for serious crimes under international law,
unless the victims of such crimes have been able to avail themselves of an
effective remedy and obtain a fair and effective decision; (ii) individuals
should always be prosecuted and sentenced for criminal acts connected with
the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; and
(iii) persons should have the right to refuse amnesty in order to have their
involvement in criminal conduct established in a fair hearing.47
Contributions of legal scholars to the standards that ought to inform the
establishment and functioning of truth commissions and the granting of
amnesty range from fairly general directives48 to the quite specific.49
Robert Weiner included in his list of guideline proposals for truth
commissions and amnesty an impressive list of "minimum requirements":
truth commissions should include an affirmative inquiry into the facts by the
appropriate authorities, an opportunity for victims to tell their stories, and
adjudication of sorts aimed at a finding of facts and determination of the
45 Joinet, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, 48 ESCOR, Annex 1I,
Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (26 June 1996), reprinted in 59 L. & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 250 (1996).
461d., at 256.
471 d., at 273.
4 See, for example, Kritz, supra note 8, at 142 (noting that truth commissions should
facilitate a degree of national consensus, provide the basis for practical and symbolic measures
to deal with abuses of the past, and execute their mandate in a limited period of time);
Landsman, supra note 10, at 89-90 (the establishment of a truth commission should enjoy
majoritarian support, its operation must entail full and effective investigations into past
atrocities, and its purposes should include the identification and compensation of victims);
Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 375, 379 (1997) (identifying as purposes of a truth commission (i) to establish an
historical record; (ii) to obtain justice for the victims; (iii) to facilitate national reconciliation; and
(iv) to deter further violence and abuses); Michael Scharf, supra note 20, at 189.
491Douglas Cassel listed ten guidelines for truth commissions and amnesty: the democratic
adoption thereof; full investigations into the facts; naming names; securing victim participation;
affording compensation to victims; excluding crimes against humanity from amnesty
arrangements; disqualifying for amnesty persons guilty of perjury and the obstruction of justice;
excluding treaty crimes such as torture and violations of women; compelling the state to
acknowledge its responsibility; and excluding from amnesty serious violations of human rights.
Cassel, supra note 11, at 228-29; and see also Dugard, supra note 8, at 289-90.
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relevant law.5 0 In order to comply with the demands of international law,
the granting of amnesty must likewise be subjected to certain conditions:
amnesty must not preclude an individual investigation and adjudication
of the facts in each case; amnesty must not preclude the right of victims
to seek and to obtain reparation from the state, even if it does foreclose
civil liability of the individual perpetrators of criminal acts;
amnesty must not preclude public acknowledgment and publication of
the relevant facts, including the identities of perpetrators of criminal
conduct;
amnesty should not be available to persons who declined to submit to
the personal jurisdiction of the relevant authorities;
persons seeking amnesty must affirmatively petition for amnesty, and
participate in the investigation by making a full disclosure of their role in
the acts and omissions for which amnesty is sought.51
Other "important conditions" identified by Weiner will require that
applications for amnesty be decided by the regularly constituted judicial
system; that discretion in applying the guidelines for amnesty be limited by
legislation that governs the requirements to be satisfied and the procedures
to be followed for amnesty applications; that the entire process should be
carried out within the parameters of the state's constitutional framework;
that the proceedings be conducted in public and the findings be made public,
but with due regard to confidentiality concerns applying to victims and
other witnesses; and that particular sanctions, such as removal from or
disqualification for public office, not be waived as part of a grant of amnesty.
According to Weiner, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) approximated the model based on these guidelines.5 2
C. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (The TRC)
The TRC has clearly set a standard that could be applied by the ICC to
interrogate the notion of "unwillingness." It operated through three distinct
committees:
50 Weiner, supra note 31, at 870.
51 Id., at 871.
52 Id., at 872-74.
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the Committee on Human Rights Violations, which provided a platform for
victims and perpetrators of atrocities committed during a defined period of
the apartheid era to testify as to their suffering or wrongdoing;
the Committee on Amnesty, a judicial body that considered the amnesty
applications of offenders on all sides of the political divide under rules
laying down the conditions for amnesty; and
the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, which has been entrusted
with powers to award to victims reparations, in a variety of forms and to
facilitate their rehabilitation from the consequences of criminal conduct and
repression.
With these components of the TRC in mind, Martha Minow observed:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
illustrates an innovative and promising effort to combine an
investigation into what happened, a forum for victim
perpetrators who honestly tell of their role in politically
motivated violence. 53
It is important to note that amnesty afforded to perpetrators of atrocities
committed as part of the crime of apartheid did not exclude retribution in
one form or the other. It has been rightly pointed out that the TRC did not
only uncovered atrocities committed during the apartheid era but also
affected the lives of almost all South Africans in general:
One only has to imagine where South Africa would be
today but for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
order to appreciate what it has achieved. Few South
Africans have been untouched by it. All sectors of its society
have been forced to look at their own participation in
apartheid- the business community, the legal, medical, and
university communities. A substantial number of white
South Africans, all of whom willingly or unwillingly
benefited from the evil system, have experienced regret or
shame or embarrassment.5 4
John Dugard is of the opinion that the current state of international law
does not bar the granting of conditional amnesty for international crimes in
53 MINOW, supra note 15, at 3.
-4 Richard J. Goldstone, Introduction, in BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note
15, at xii.
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circumstances of the kind that prevailed in South Africa. The standards
established by the South African precedent, include the following special
attributes:55
1. The TRC resulted from a compact between parties on all sides of the
political spectrum;
2. Establishment of the TRC was formally authorized by a negotiated
Constitution 6 and the essence of its composition, functions and powers was
enacted by a democratically elected legislature;57
55 Dugard, supra note 8 at at 307.
56 The Postscript of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, Act 200 of 1993,
contained the following powerful statement on National Unity and Reconciliation:
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a
deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all
South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African
citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa
and the restructuring of society.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the
people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past,
which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of
humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear,
guilt and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for
understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for
retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty
shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with
political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.
To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law
determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990
and before December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall
be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.
With this Constitution and these commitments we, the people of South
Africa, open a new chapter in the history of our country.
Nkosi sikelel' iAfrika. God sein Suid-Afrika.
Morena boloka sechaba sa heso. May God bless our country.
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3. The TRC in all its committees was broadly representative of all the
peoples of South Africa;
4. The TRC, including its Amnesty Committee, acted independent of the
Government;
5. The TRC was sufficiently funded and provided with adequate resources
to enable it to conduct a thorough investigation into the crimes of the past,
and in its Amnesty Committee to fully establish the circumstances and
motivations that prompted the atrocities for which amnesty was sought.
6. The Committee on Human Rights Violations was given a wide mandate
to investigate "the gross violations of human rights" over a period of thirty-
four years and to receive testimony at public hearings from the victims of
such violations.
7. Transparency essentially attended all the activities of the TRC;
8. The perpetrators of the violations of human rights could be named, but
adequate safeguards were provided to ensure that their procedural rights
were protected.58
9. The TRC was required, through its Third Committee, to recommend the
payment of compensation to victims or other forms of redress;
10. The granting of amnesty was not unconditional: no person was afforded
a reprieve unless he or she applied for amnesty, made a full disclosure of the
crimes for which they sought amnesty, and established that they acted for a
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afrika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.
57 See the (South African) Promotion of National Unity Act 34 of 1995. Its constitutionality
was confirmed in AZAPO & OTHERS v. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 (4) SA
671 (CC).
5 See Du PREEZ & ANOTHER v. TRUTH AND RECONCIuATION COMMISSION, 1997 (3) SA 204
(A) (holding that the TRC and its Committee on Human Rights Violations are under a duty to
act fairly toward persons implicated to their detriment by evidence or information coming
before the Committee in the course of its investigations and/or hearings, and this includes
affording to the person implicated the opportunity to submit representations or give evidence
before the Commission: audi alteram parten). See also NIEUWOUDT v. TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, 1997 (2) SA 70 (SE) (holding that the TRC is not compelled to give
prior notice to a person that might be implicated, even if the Commission does have prior notice
of such implication). In terms of s. 31(3) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act 34 of 1995, incriminating testimony given before the Committee on Human Rights
Violations is not admissible in evidence against the persons who have incriminated themselves
in any criminal case against those persons, except on charges of perjury and giving of false
evidence.
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known political organization and committed the criminal act with a political
objective.
11. The Committee on Human Rights Violations had to submit its final
report within a reasonable time - less than three years.
Persons applying for amnesty did not have to show remorse for their
wrongdoing. Remorse can easily be faked and the fact that amnesty was not
dependent on remorse at least had this much to its credit: persons who did
express their regrets at the public sessions of the Committee on Human
Rights Violations were most likely sincere.
There was a cut-off date for applications for amnesty which had a
positive effect. Wrongdoers who failed to apply for amnesty, or whose
application for amnesty was rejected, could be prosecuted. While many
perpetrators of politically inspired crimes initially wagered that their
involvement in dirty play would go undetected, a considerable number did
come forward as the closing date for amnesty applications approached.
II. THE FUTURE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND AMNESTIES UNDER THE ICC REGIME
Truth Commissions, according to Martha Minow, are not a second-best
alternative to prosecutions but are indeed better suited to meet many of the
goals of restorative justice.59 Truth commissions and amnesty, according to
another analyst, "require prudential judgment and high statesmanship." 6°
This raises the question how the ICC ought to respond to the granting of
amnesties attending a peace settlement in communities in transition.
Two trends of thought prevail in this regard. On the one hand are those
who believe that amnesty for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC ought
never to exclude a finding of "unwillingness" for purposes of inviting the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. On the other hand are those who
maintain that special circumstances attending a community in political
distress should preclude prosecution in the ICC of members of a prior
regime for atrocities committed in the preceding era of repression. These
two trends highlight the tension between retributive justice and restorative
59 MINOW, supra note 15, at 88.
60 Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court. , a America View, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L 93,
95-97 (1999).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-2000-2003
justice. They invoke the the search for "a solution which balances the duty of
prosecution with the fact that peace is not always available by such means." 61
The Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court that was forwarded to
Rome by the Preparatory Committee contained an Article, originally
proposed by Portugal and Belgium, which provided that the jurisdiction of
the ICC would not be excluded in cases where national authorities have
taken ."a manifestly unfounded decision" to suspend the enforcement of a
sentence, or to grant a pardon, parole, or the commutation of a sentence
imposed by the national court in respect of a crime within the jurisdiction of
the ICC and where such a decision would "exclude the application of any
appropriate form of sentence." 62 The provision was extremely controversial.
Some delegations expressed the opinion that the ICC ought not to interfere
with administrative decisions of the criminal justice authorities of national
states (parole) or with political decisions of government officials (pardons
and amnesties). Others believed that the provision was not necessary
because the provisions on admissibility afforded to the ICC adequate scope
to act upon pardons and amnesties made in bad faith.63 Turkey submitted a
formal proposal in Rome that the provision be deleted,64 which was
accepted. This supports a demand for respect by the ICC for suspension of
sentences, pardons, parole and commutation of sentences decided upon by
the appropriate authorities of the national state. It is more likely however
that the Article was deleted because the prospect of achieving consensus for
the provision was grim, in any event, these matters can indeed be resolved
by the ICC under the norms pertaining to "unwillingness" and ne bis in idem.
There are, on the one hand, clear indications that establishment of the
ICC was intended to rule out (unconditional) amnesties for any of the core
crimes of customary international law. The Preamble to the ICC statute thus
bears testimony of the founders' determination "to put an end to impunity
for the perpetrators of ... [the most serious crimes of concern to the
61 Gerhard Hafner, Kristen Boon, Anne Rilbesame & Jonathan Huston, A Response to the
American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 108, 109 (1999).
62 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1
(14 April 1998).
63 See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 59-60 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 1999).
6Proposal Submitted by Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.50 (6 July 1998).
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international community] and thus to the prevention of such crimes" and
recalls that "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes."65 The Secretary-General of
the United Nations, in his 1998 report on the work of the Organization,
testified that the aim of the ICC was "to put an end to the global culture of
impunity - the culture in which it has been easier to bring someone to
justice for killing one person than for killing 100,000."66 The norm against
impunity does of course not rule out the salience of truth commissions per se.
It is submitted, though, that the ICC ought to be sensitive to bona fide
attempts of countries in transition to come to terms with their past and to
seek reconciliation through strategies of restorative justice. The matter was
indeed raised in the Preparatory Committee that preceded the Rome
Conference, but the legitimacy of amnesties in special circumstances was
presumably deliberately left in abeyance. The Chair of the Committee of the
Whole at the Rome Conference, Philippe Kirsch, described the provisions of
the ICC statute that might have a bearing on truth commissions and amnesty
as reflecting "creative ambiguity." 67 It has been noted that the absence of
clear provisions in the ICC Statute dealing with pardons represents
potentially, though not insurmountably, the greatest weakness of the
complementarity regime: "The lacunae may permit a State to investigate,
prosecute, convict and sentence a person, and then pardon or parole the
person soon thereafter."6 However, if such pardons or parole are
considered to result from unwillingness on the part of the national
authorities to bring the perpetrator to justice, the jurisdiction of the ICC in
the matter will not be excluded.
It is reasonable to assume that the ICC will consider the merits of truth
commissions under the rubric of "unwillingness" and the directives of ne bis
in idem: if a truth commission has been established "for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court,"69 or if the proceedings of the truth
commission "were not.., conducted independently or impartially, and they
were ... conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent
6 ICC Statute, supra note 2, Fifth and Sixths preambular paragraph.
6 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, par. 180 (at 24), 53 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/53/1 (27 Aug. 1998).
67 Scharf, supra note 20, at 186.
6 Holmes, supra note 63, at 76.
6 ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17(2)(a) and 20 (3)(a).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-2000-2003
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice," 70 then amnesty will
be of no avail to the accused.
Michael Scharf has stated that amnesties "should be the last resort
reserved for the most compelling situations."7' He considered several
provisions of the ICC statute under which amnesties might be permitted as
exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC:
Security Council deferral of an investigation or prosecution for a (renewable)
period of 12 months pursuant to a decision of the Council adopted under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.72
The purpose of the provision in the ICC Statute is to protect the Security
Council's interests and jurisdiction to decide whether a particular situation.
It constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression, and to mandate action to deal with such a situation. It therefore
seems highly inappropriate for the Security Council to use this power in
order to uphold the granting of amnesties - except if the Security Council
could certify that not honoring an impunity-for-peace agreement would
constitute a threat to international peace and security.
The ICC itself can decide that the case against a person who reaped the
benefit of an impunity-for-peace deal is admissible on the basis (i) that the
case has been investigated by the State which granted the amnesty, and (ii)
that the decision not to proceed with a prosecution in the national courts of
that State was not taken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.73
Several conditions will have to be satisfied before a finding of
admissibility would be warranted under this rubric: First, the state officials
deciding upon amnesties and the granting of amnesty in the particular
instance must have responsibly applied their minds to the matter. Secondly,
the truth commission-cum-amnesty arrangement must serve a purpose other
than a resolve to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility.
Thirdly, it would perhaps be important to show that the granting of amnesty
did not exclude retributive consequences for the culprits, such as public
70 Id., art. 17(2)(c); and see also id., art. 20(3)(b). See Danesh Sarooshi,The Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 48 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 387,393 (1999).
71 Scharf, supra note 20, at 182.
72 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
7Id., art. 17(1)(b), read with art. 17(2)(a).
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exposure and disgrace, the loss of employment and employment
opportunities, and/or personal and material sacrifices.
The ICC Statute upholds the principle of ne bis in idem, and since the
granting of amnesty amounts, legally, to a finding of not guilty, the question
might be posed whether the beneficiary of amnesty could not enter a plea of
autrefois acquit when brought before the ICC.
It might be noted in this regard that the ICC should be seen as an
extension of the national courts with primacy of jurisdiction in a matter
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Depicting the jurisdiction
of the ICC as "complementary to" that of the national court should make this
clear. However, constructing the relationship between the ICC and national
courts as being a matter of extended or, alternatively, of original jurisdiction
would make no difference in the present context because the principle of ne
bis in idem as contemplated in the ICC Statute excludes double jeopardy
"with respect to the same conduct" 74 (and not for "the same crime").
There are other complicating issues though. For example, State A cannot
grant amnesty for a crime committed in State B,75 and although persons
cannot be prosecuted in the state that granted them amnesty, they can still be
brought to trial for the same act in the country where the crime was
committed. 76 Since the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are subject
to universal jurisdiction, the question arises whether the same principle can
be applied to such crimes if committed in the country that granted amnesty
to the perpetrator thereof. It seems logical that the answer to this question
should be affirmative.
However, the ICC Statute makes its rule against double jeopardy
conditional upon a trial in "another court" and it is highly unlikely that the
ICC will regard amnesty hearings or truth commissions as proceedings of
"another court."
71 Id., art. 21(3).
75 Stephen Landsman maintains that amnesty ought never to be granted for crimes
committed against the citizens of a foreign state. Landsman, supra note 10, at 90-91.
76 It appeared from testimony in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
that agents of the apartheid regime had committed criminal acts, including damage to property,
murder and attempted murder, in for example London, Paris and Maputo, and the amnesty
granted to perpetrators of those crimes will not preclude their prosecution in England, France,
or Mozambique. President Mandela stated that South Africa is prepared to honor its
international commitment-where applicable-to extradite persons that have been granted
amnesty in South Africa to stand trial in countries where an extraditable offence has been
committed.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-2000-2003
A decision taken by the Prosecutor not to initiate an investigation
because, taking into consideration the gravity of the crime(s) committed by
the person(s) who has/have been granted immunity and the interests of
victims of those crimes, "there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice."77
This seems to be the most plausible avenue for upholding amnesties
granted as part of a political compromise. The grounds specified for a
decision not to proceed with an investigation will ensure that the standards
outlined above have been complied with by the Truth Commission and its
amnesty committee- particularly that the interests of victims have been
served. The decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation
for the reason stated is furthermore subject to review by the Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC.
III. CONCLUSION
One of the most outstanding (positive) features of the ICC Statute is its
concern for the interests of victims of any of the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Provision is made in the Statute for court orders
granting reparation to victims, involving restitution, reparation and
rehabilitation; a Trust Fund is to be established for the benefit of victims and
their families,as well as a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide protection
measures and security arrangements, counseling and other appropriate
assistance for witnesses and victims who appear before the Court, as well as
other persons who might be at risk for providing testimony to the ICC. The
ICC is instructed to take appropriate precautions for the protection of the
safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims
and of witnesses, taking into account factors such as age, gender, and health
of the person to be protected and the nature of the crime (with special
emphasis on crimes involving sexual and gender violence or violence against
children). Victims may be granted the right to have their views and concerns
voiced (personally or through legal representation) at all stages of the
proceedings that might affect their personal interests, and, as already noted,
a decision of the Prosecutor to discontinue an investigation in the interests of
justice must be informed by, among other things, the interests of victims.
Under the ICC regime, amnesties attending the institution of truth
commissions will therefore only withstand "unwillingness" scrutiny if they
include, as a minimum requirement, appropriate measures for
77 ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 53(1)(c).
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accommodating the interests of the victims of crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC.

